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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AS A MEANS OF
PROTECTING PERFORMERS' STYLE
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago Melville Nimmer, in his seminal article on
the right of publicity, recognized the inadequacies of the right of pri-
vacy, unfair competition, and other legal theories as a means of
preventing the unauthorized use of a celebrity's name, likeness or per-
sonality.' He seriously doubted "that the application of [the privacy]
concept satisfactorily [met] the needs of Broadway and Hollywood in
1954,",2 and instead, advocated the adoption of the right of publicity,
under which the pecuniary value of one's personality could be more
adequately protected.3 It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that a quarter
of a century later, when the exploitation of celebrity status has become
such "an integral part of American merchandising,"' 4 the contours of
the right of publicity remain so unclear, and resort must still be had to
more traditional, yet inadequate, legal theories.
The combination of the increasingly common problem of the un-
authorized commercial appropriation of a performer's likeness, voice,
mannerisms and distinctive style, and the absence of the full recogni-
tion of the right of publicity as forecast by Nimmer5 has resulted in a
situation in which established performers are unable to control their
exposure so as not to diminish either their distinction, or the attendant
public attention and economic advantages.
This comment examines the possibility of protection for the
unique style and identity of a performer under the doctrine of the right
of publicity. Protection would require both a broader reading of the
phrase "name, likeness and identity" often used in defining the right of
publicity than it has heretofore been given,6 as well as a more precise
1. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as Nimmer].
2. Id. at 203.
3. Id. at 214.
4. Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 751, 751 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Descent of the Right ofPublicity]. Annual royalties
for licensing one's celebrity status, in the form of famous names, titles, slogans, etc., are
estimated at over $35 million. Brenner, What's in a Name and Who Owns It?, Winter 1979
BARRISTER 43 [hereinafter cited as Brenner].
5. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 223.
6. See, e.g., Rader, The 'Right of Publicity'"--A New Dimension, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y
228 (1979). For an example of the insufficiency of the publicity doctrine when the defini-
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delineation of the scope of the doctrine itself. A brief overview of the
development of the right of publicity will provide a basis for its appli-
cation in this regard, and comparison will be drawn with other avail-
able theories of protection. The conclusion suggested is that a
performer's truly unique and identifiable characteristics are worthy of
protection, and the right of publicity provides the suitable means for
that protection.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Much of the continuing uncertainty surrounding the right of pub-
licity is due to the fact that it has most often been discussed under the
rubric of the right of privacy, and has been said to have evolved from
the privacy right.7 In actuality, however, the two rights are distinguish-
able, particularly in terms of the respective interests each seeks to pro-
tect.
As first articulated in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis,' the right of privacy was concerned with the "right to be let
alone"9 and with the ability to protect against the publication of one's
thoughts, sentiments, and other matters relating to the private life of an
individual.'° The most widely accepted modem formulation of the pri-
vacy right is that of Dean Prosser, whose analysis treats privacy as a
complex of four separate types of invasions, with the only common fac-
tor being that "each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff. . . 'to be let alone'. ' ' I IThese are:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing pri-
vate facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. Appropriation,
for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or like-
tional phrase is construed strictly, see Booth v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), in text accompanying notes 71-73 and 82-83 infra.
7. See Descent ofthe Right of Publicity, supra note 4, at 752; Note, Performer's Right of
Publicity: A Limitation on News Privilege, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 587, 595 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Performer's Right of Publicity]. The notion that the right of publicity "evolved
from" the right of privacy is accurate only in the sense that it was the inadequacies of the
right of privacy that necessitated judicial recognition of the right of publicity. See generally
E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 453 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as KINTNER & LAHR]; Nimmer, supra note I, at 203-04.
8. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
9. Id. at 193.
10. Id. at 198, 216.
11. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Privacy].
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ness. 12
It is this fourth type of interest that has been confused with the right of
publicity.
Although Prosser did recognize the proprietary nature of the
fourth category of appropriation,13 and distinguished it as the only one
involving "a use for the defendant's advantage,"' 4 he failed to discuss
the possibility that the appropriation of one's name and likeness for the
defendant's commercial advantage might have a very different result if
that individual himself has undertaken to commercialize his name or
likeness. Thus, the category's inclusion within Prosser's definition of
privacy "tends to obscure the distinction between appropriation of the
name or likeness of a public figure and such appropriation in the case
of a private individual.""' This lack of clarity represents a fundamen-
tal inadequacy of the privacy right for protecting the performer whose
name, likeness or identity has become commercially valuable.
Moreover, Prosser's statements to the effect that each category in-
volves the right to be let alone, and that each of the four rights is per-
sonal and not assignable,' 6 are rather misleading, and serve to
underscore the confusion caused by the intermingling of the right of
privacy and the right of publicity. It is therefore crucial to highlight the
differences between the two rights.
The essence of a cause of action for invasion of privacy is "not
injury to the character or reputation, but a direct wrong of a personal
character resulting in injury to the feelings without regard to any effect
which the publication may have on the property, business, pecuniary
interest, or the standing of the individual in the community."' 7 Thus,
recovery for an invasion of privacy redresses the plaintift's mental dis-
tress 18 caused by the exposure to unwanted publicity. It would be
rather incongruous, however, to suggest that celebrities or well-known
personalities suffer the same type of injury by having their names or
images publicized, as would the private citizen. Indeed, with celebrities
12. Id.
13. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 807 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PRos-
SER].
14. Id. at 814.
15. Note, Yhe Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Fiures and Celebrities, 42
BROOKLYN L. REv. 527, 531 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Protection for Public Fgures].
16. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 804, 814-15.
17. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 291 P.2d 194,
197 (1955).
18. But cf. Privacy, supra note 11, at 400 (false light cases differ in that the "interest
protected is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defa-
mation.").
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it is more often the case that "publicity is desired inasmuch as a celeb-
rity's income may be directly proportionate to his or her degree of
fame." 19 For example, in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. ,2" a well-known
football player, seeking to prevent the defendant's use of his picture in
a beer advertisement, was denied relief based on a cause of action for
invasion of privacy. The court stated that "the publicity [plaintiff] got
was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving
"21
On the other hand, when a celebrity's name or likeness has devel-
oped a commercial value, the injury caused by a defendant's exploita-
tion thereof may be only of an economic nature.22 The "injured"
plaintiff in this type of situation objects, not necessarily to the commer-
cial use of his or her name or likeness, but to the fact that such unau-
thorized use violates his or her right "to control and profit from the
publicity values which he has created or purchased."23
This distinction between the two interests-emotional and
financial-was drawn in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
19. Protection for Public Figures, supra note 15, at 533.
20. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1941). Accord, Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (action for invasion of privacy in broad-
casting plaintiff's trained animal act performed at a football game; real injury was non-
payment). See also Nimmer, supra note 1, at 203-04.
21. 124 F.2d at 170.
22. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1974).
As the court noted, however, the possibility does exist that the appropriation of a celebrity's
identity may also cause the type of mental injury normally associated with privacy actions.
Id. at 824-25 n. 11.
Conversely, it could be suggested that even persons not known to the general public
actually have a property right of publicity. This might very well be the case, for example, in
situations in which an "ordinary consumer" has been captured by a hidden camera and then
made the focus of a commercial campaign. Nevertheless, a private individual has not cre-
ated the same sort of tangible and saleable product in his or her name or likeness as has the
celebrity, and therefore the right of publicity in such cases would be of little, if any, commer-
cial value. See Nimmer, supra note I, at 217. The best solution would probably be to
permit non-celebrity plaintiffs to prove the pecuniary value, if any of their names and like-
ness. See Performer's Right of Publicity, supra note 7, at 601 n. 90. Finally, one commenta-
tor has concluded that California Civil Code section 3344 confers a property right (in the
form of a right of publicity) on every individual in California in their personal identity by
virtue of the minimum statutory damages:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner for purposes of advertising. . . or for purposes of solicitation. . . without
such person's prior consent. . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured. . . [and] in an amount no less than three hundred dol-
lars ($300).
Note, Commercial Appropriation Of An Individual'r Name, Photograph Or Likeness: A New
Remedy For Californians, 3 PAC. L.J. 651, 669 (1972).
23. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 216.
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Gum, Inc. ,24 in which the right of publicity was explicitly recognized
for the first time. In Haelan Laboratories the plaintiff had an exclusive
contract with a baseball player to use the ballplayer's photograph in
connection with the plaintiff's sale of bubble gum. The ballplayer was
subsequently induced to grant the same right to the defendant, one of
the plaintiffs competitors. The plaintiff maintained that the defend-
ant's use of the picture for the same purpose involved plaintiffs exclu-
sive rights. The defendant contended, however, that plaintiff's theory
was untenable in that the contracts involved were no more than re-
leases of the liability that the plaintiff would have otherwise incurred
by using the picture and thereby invading the ballplayer's privacy; and
inasmuch as the privacy right was personal and not assignable, the
plaintiff had no standing to sue.25 The court rejected the defendant's
contentions and held for the plaintiff, finding that the ballplayer had
assigned a right that was distinguishable from the right of privacy. The
court reasoned as follows:
We think that, in addition to and independent of [the] right of
privacy. . . a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, ie., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made "in gross," i e., without an accompanying transfer of a
business or of anything else. Whether it be labelled a "prop-
erty" right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag
"property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a
claim which has pecuniary worth.
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing ad-
vertisements [and] popularizing their countenances ....
This right of publicity would usually yield. . . no money un-
less it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant ... .26
The court's language clearly appreciated "the pecuniary interest pro-
tected by the right of publicity that distinguishes it from the right of
privacy." 27 But an even more precise delineation of the distinct interest
a celebrity has in his or her name and likeness appeared four years
24. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
25. Id. at 867.
26. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
27. Protection for Public Figures, supra note 15, at 535.
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after the Haelan Laboratories decision, in Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co. 28
In that case the defendant had used the name and picture of the famous
golfer, Ben Hogan, on the cover and in the text of a book, in such a.
manner as to imply that Hogan had participated in some way with its
writing.29 Although Hogan had asserted five different theories for re-
covery, including invasion of privacy, the court perceived the inappro-
priateness of the privacy right as a basis for controlling the commercial
uses of a celebrity's personal characteristics. Rather, the court said, the
true ground of Hogan's cause of action was "the very antithesis of the
right of privacy" 30 consisting of the misappropriation of the commer-
cial value of his name and likeness, and the lack of compensation
therefor.
However, it was the Haelan Laboratories decision that laid the
groundwork for many later cases in which a well-known personality's
proprietary right in his or her name, likeness and identity was recog-
nized and protected against appropriation for unauthorized commer-
cial purposes.32
28. 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (1957).
29. Id. at 318-19.
30. Id. at 316.
3 I. ld. The court discussed the specific differences between the right of privacy and the
right of publicity:
On the one hand, where plaintiff is a person previously unknown to the gen-
eral public, that is, one who has lived a life of relative obscurity insofar as publicity
is concerned, the gist of his complaint is that, by reason of the publication of his
picture in connection with the advertisement of a product, he has been unwillingly
exposed to the glare of public scrutiny. In such a case, plaintiff's right of privacy
has truly been invaded.
On the other hand, where plaintiff is a person who may be termed a "public
figure", such as an actor or an athlete, the gist of his complaint is entirely different.
He does not complain that, by reason of the publication of his picture in connec-
tion with the advertisement of a product, his name and face have become a matter
of public comment, but rather that the commercial value which has attached to his
name because of the fact that he is a public figure has been exploited without his
having shared in the profits therefrom.
Id. at 315-16.
The court later concluded, however, that the protection offered by the right of publicity
was another mode of applying the doctrine of unfair competition. Id. at 320. Although the
analogy may have been suitable in the circumstances of the Hogan case, inasmuch as the
defendant's book was actually in competition with Hogan's own writings on golf, the unfair
competition doctrine has generally been inadequate for protecting the interests that the right
of publicity is designed to protect. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 210-14. For a further
discussion of these inadequacies, see notes 154-67 infra and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978), cer.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) ("There can be no doubt that Elvis Presley assigned. . . a valid
property right, the exclusive authority to print, publish and distribute his name and like-
ness."); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("We think
it is clear that, during their lifetimes, Laurel and Hardy each had such a property right,
1980] RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
In addition to the underlying distinction between the right of pri-
vacy as protection for an emotional interest and the right of publicity as
protection for an economic interest, there are other important differ-
ences between the two rights. A brief discussion of these differences
should serve to define the contours of the right of publicity.
One major difference between the rights of privacy and publicity
relates to the nature of the rights involved. Specifically, the right of
privacy is a personal right,33 and hence is not assignable,34 nor does it
survive the plaintiff (in the absence of statutory provision).35 In con-
trast, the right of publicity is of a proprietary nature, if not an actual
property right.36 As such, it can be assigned and transferred in whole
distinct from. . . statutory protection, in his name and likeness."); Uhlaender v. Henrick-
sen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) ("[A] celebrity has a legitimate proprietary
interest in his public personality. . . . That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statis-
tics and other personal characteristics is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property.").
33. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 814; Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Person-
aliy and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 553, 595 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Gordon].
34. See, e.g., Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935); PROSSER, supra note 13, at 815.
35. Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (N.D. Ohio 1969),
aft'd, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970); PROSSER, supra note 13, at 815; Gordon, supra note 33, at
595.
36. There apparently remains some hesitancy to accord the right of publicity a well-
defined property status. Some courts and commentators have clearly recognized and labeled
it a property right. See cases cited supra note 32; Nimmer, supra note 1, at 216; KINTNER &
LAHR, supra note 7, at 459. Other sources, however, have refused to be so explicit. For
example, in the Haelan Laboratories decision, although the holding that the right was capa-
ble of assignment indicated that it was necessarily viewed as a property right, Judge Frank
said that whether the right of publicity "be labelled a 'property' right is immaterial" because
"the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuni-
ary worth." 202 F.2d at 868. Similarly, Prosser has stated that "[i]t seems quite pointless to
dispute over whether such a right is to be classified as 'property;'. .. " PROSSER, supra note
13, at 807.
In California, the right of publicity has been relegated to a rather dubious status. In
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979), Bela
Lugosi's heirs sued a motion picture company, seeking the profits made by the defendant in
selling licenses for the manufacture of various commercial items using Lugosi's likeness in
his role as Count Dracula. The plaintiffs alleged that they had inherited Lugosi's exclusive
right to exploit the commercial value of his likeness as Dracula. The California Supreme
Court rejected this contention, adopting as its own the opinion of a court of appeal, which
agreed with Prosser's conclusion that the property label dispute was "pointless," id. at 819,
603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326, and held instead that the right to exploit the publicity
value of one's name and likeness is a personal one. Id. at 821, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 329. The court's basic premise was that this "'right of value' to create a business,
product or service of value" was protectable only by the personal right of privacy, thus
leading to the ultimate holding that this right did not survive the death of the actor. Id at
819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326. According to the court, Lugosi had never exer-
cised his right to exploit the commercial value of his likeness, had not transformed his "right
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
or in part. 7 Additionally, it may be inherited upon the death of the
of value" into "things of value," and therefore this unexercised opportunity should not be
descendible. Id.
In so characterizing the right of publicity, the Lugosi court completely failed to disasso-
ciate it from the appropriation form of the right of privacy. See notes 12-23 supra and
accompanying text. The court also produced a particularly anomalous result, in that despite
the classification of the exploitation right as a personal one, the court acknowledged that the
right is assignable, stating that "[a]ssignment of the right. . . by the 'owner' thereof is sy-
nonymous with its exercise." 25 Cal. 3d at 823, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
Nevertheless, the court concluded, the fact that Lugosi had actually made such an assign-
ment of his name and likeness to the defendant for exploitation related to the film Dracula
was not equivalent to the exercise of the right as to other commercial situations not affected
by that assignment. Id. More judicious reasoning would have recognized that, even assum-
ing a prerequisite of exercise, the proper question should ask whether the name and likeness
have been exploited, not whether a particular commercial situation has been exploited.
Otherwise, a performer would be unable to protect rights related to exploitations not practi-
cable or possible during his or her lifetime, nor to capitalize on such exploitations for the
maximum benefit of his or her heirs in addition to his or her own benefit. See Descent ofthe
Right of Publicity, supra note 4, at 765. Beyond this, the court's imposition of the require-
ment of prior exercise lacked convincing rationalization. This, combined with the absence
of a clear explanation of the term "exercise," only adds to the remaining confusion sur-
rounding the publicity right.
In addition, the Lugosi court failed to justify its rejection of the property label, and, in
fact, ignored an earlier interpretation of the concept of property that would readily encom-
pass the publicity right. In Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 207 Cal. 521,
523, 279 P. 128, 129 (1929), the court said that the term "'property' is sufficiently compre-
hensive to include every species of estate, real and personal, and everything which one per-
son can own and transfer to another. It extends to every species of right and interest capable
of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value." Adoption of
this construction clearly would have suggested a contrary result in the Lugosi case.
The Ninth Circuit position is also unclear. In Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco, Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), the court recognized the proprietary interest one
has in his or her identity, and concluded that the California appellate courts would protect
such an interest; but the court declined to speculate as to whether it would be done under the
heading of privacy, property or publicity. Id. at 825-26. Ironically, the Maotschenbacher
court did acknowledge the Yuba River characterization of property and its appositeness to
the right of publicity, id. at 826 n. 14, but nevertheless failed to expressly recognize publicity
right as a property-based one. Unfortunately, their declination appeared to have been a
fairly accurate perception of what was to come in the Lugosi decision.
It is true that even the courts that have failed to accept the property label have at least
recognized the proprietary nature of the publicity right (as the Lugosi court did by implica-
tion, by accepting Prosser's analysis, see note 13 supra and accompanying text). It must be
emphasized nevertheless that the property status is, in fact, essential in "furnishing a firm
basis for distinguishing between claims which have a solid pecuniary worth and those in-
volving injured feelings," Gordon, supra note 33, at 607, in addition to being "the prerequi-
site to transferability." Note, Transfer of the Right of Publicit,. Dracula's Progeny and
Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1103, 1117 (1975); See text accompanying notes 39-
40 infra. An express clarification by the courts of the property basis of the right of publicity
would undoubtedly help to eliminate the confusion so prevalent in this area of the law.
37. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); KINTNER & LAHR,
supra note 7, at 459. Even courts that have not accepted the "property" label, see note 36
supra, have acknowledged the assignability of the publicity right. See discussion of Lugosi
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person whose efforts created the publicity values. 38 This distinction is
crucial, in that "It]he publicity value of a prominent person's name and
portrait is greatly restricted if this value cannot be assigned to
others,"39 and would probably yield "no money unless it could be
made the subject of an exclusive grant ...."I'
Another major difference between privacy and publicity involves
the measure of damages for a violation of the respective rights. In an
action for an invasion of privacy, damages include compensation for
the injury to the plaintiff's feelings and for mental distress, as well as
special and punitive damages.4 On the other hand, in a publicity ac-
tion, damages are measured by the value received by the defendant by
virtue of the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name or likeness, 42 or
by the plaintiffs financial loss or impairment of his or her publicity
values. 3 This requires consideration of such factors as the fame of the
plaintiff, the market value of his or her publicity rights, and the share of
the plaintiff's profits diverted to the defendant as a result of the appro-
priation.' Also, as one court has noted, in determining the damages in
a publicity action, a court can "take judicial notice that there is a fairly
active market for exploitation of the faces, names and reputations of
celebrities, and such market-like any other-must have its recognized
rules and experts. 45 Thus, even though public figures have often used
a theory of invasion of privacy and have sometimes been successful,
46
in actuality they were complaining of the misappropriation of their
name and likeness. Recovery in such a situation is restricted by an
v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979), at note 36
supra. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
38. E.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,.
440 U.S. 908 (1979); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Cf. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979),
discussed in note 36 supra. As noted, the court in Lugosi held that Lugosi had not exercised
his right of publicity, and therefore actually left open the question of whether an "exercised"
right of publicity would be descendible. For a more complete discussion of the
descendibility issue, see Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 4.
39. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 209.
40. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
41. See PROSSER, supra note 13, at 815; Nimmer, supra note 1, at 208-09.
42. KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 7, at 459; Protection for Public Figures, supra note 15,
at 533.
43. Performer's Right of Publicity, supra note 7, at 601.
44. Gordon, supra note 33, at 611.
45. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
46. See generally Gordon, supra note 33.
1980]
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"artificial limitation,"47 imposed because of the privacy right's personal
nature and the attendant rule of damages.
Finally, the Supreme Court, in its acceptance of the right of pub-
licity as distinct from the right of privacy,4" noted that the two "differ in
the degree to which they intrude on dissemination of information to the
public."49 Protection of the interests in a privacy action entails the sup-
pression of the publication in question, whereas in publicity actions,
"the only question is who gets to do the publishing."5 The basis for
this distinction was the Court's recognition of the economic interest
protected by the right of publicity.
In sum, the common law right of publicity recognizes the commer-
cial value of the name, likeness and identity of a public figure, and
therefore protects the proprietary interest in his or her personality. It
exists independent of the right of privacy, and provides a basis of re-
covery distinct from unfair competition, defamation and other tradi-
tional legal theories." Admittedly, the scope of the right of publicity is
still somewhat hazy, but as the courts continue to define its limits, it
should be acknowledged as the appropriate means of protecting a ce-
lebrity's identity and personality.
III. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
TO PERFORMANCE STYLE
Most courts that have expressly or implicitly extended legal pro-
tection to the right of publicity have done so only in cases involving the
appropriation of a celebrity's name and/or likeness,52 and have not
taken cognizance of other attributes of a performer, such as voice, man-
47. Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 4, at 754.
48. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
49. Id. at 573.
50. Id. For a further discussion of the relationship between first amendment principles
and the right of publicity, see notes 132-41 infra and accompanying text.
51. See notes 144-86 infra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314
(BNA) (1957); see also cases cited note 32 supra.
A notable exception to this is the case of Price v. Hal Roach Studies, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which the court, upon a determination of the parties' respective
rights pursuant to contractual agreements, permanently enjoined the defendants from
using, selling, licensing, leasing, authorizing the use of or otherwise conveying...
the names, likenesses, characters, and characterizations, of Stan Laurel and Oliver
Hardy, (including, without limitation, use of their photographs or other reproduc-
tions of their physical likenesses, the impersonation of their physical likenesses or
appearances, costumes and mannerisms, and/or the simulation of their voices) for
advertising or commercial purposes . . ..
(Court order quoted in Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 256
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nerisms, gestures, and dress, that could be subject to similar appropria-
tion. Indeed, performance "style" has heretofore been accorded
virtually no protection from misappropriation-most commonly seen
in the form of an unauthorized imitation in a commercial setting-
under either the right of publicity or under any other legal theory.
A major obstacle to the extension of such protection has undoubt-
edly been the inability to present courts with both an acceptable defini-
tion of "style" and a method for determining how and When it should
be protected. But demonstration of the fact that style is, in fact, "capa-
ble of ascertainment and that concrete limitations do exist as to what
would constitute a protectible style"53 should render the issue of legal
protection for performance style more than a source of merely "aca-
demic" discussion,54 and instead, place it on par with other protected
intangible intellectual property rights,55 with the concomitant protec-
tion being afforded by the right of publicity.
Admittedly, accurate definitions of the term "style" are available
to support the arguments of both opponents and advocates of style pro-
tection. For example, style can be defined broadly, as a "manner or
method of acting or performing [especially] as sanctioned by some
standard."56 Thus, it may be appropriate to say, as has one opponent,
that "[s]tyles evolve [and] [t]heir vogue may be fleeting or lasting," and
therefore they should not be protected. 7 On the other hand, style is
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (1979), which involved a res judicata application of the
Hal Roach case to parties in privity with the Roach defendants, 455 F. Supp. at 266).
53. Note, Intellectual Property-Performer's Style-A Questfor Ascertainment, Recogni-
don, and Protection, 52 DEN. L.J. 561, 561 (1975) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
Performer'r Style].
54. See Lang, Performance and the Right of the Performing Artist, 21 ASCAP Copy-
RIGHT L. SYMP. 69, 73 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Right of the Performing Artist].
55. Such rights include those protected as trade secrets, which safeguard certain technol-
ogy and commercial information, under theories such as property, e.g., Ferroline Corp. v.
General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953
(1954), contract, see, e.g., L.M. Rabinowitz & Co. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct.
1948), and breach of trust or confidence, see, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Techni-
cal Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671, 192 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1959), as well as those in ideas and
business schemes that have been protected under the same general theories as applied to
trade secrets. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Liggett
& Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935) (both involving
property theory, based on findings that the respective ideas were both concrete and novel);
Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956) (implied contract theory); Carpenter
Foundation v. Oakes, 26 Cal. App. 3d 784, 103 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1972) (based on the existence
of a confidential relationship). See generally M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 16
(1979) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
56. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1148 (definition of style 4a(l)) (1979).
57. Liebig, Style andPelformance, 17 BULL. CR. Soc'y 40, 40 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Liebig].
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also defined as "a manner of expression characteristic of an individual
• . . a distinctive or characteristic manner."58 It is this latter sense of
style, as something highly unique and individualized, and immediately
identifiable as synonymous with a particular performer, that is suscep-
tible to, and worthy of, legal protection, preferably under the right of
publicity.
A brief factual review of the major cases in which performers
sought protection against the unauthorized appropriation or imitation
of their performance style and/or characteristics exemplifies the
problems encountered in seeking protection for style, as well as the
need therefore, and lays the groundwork for a discussion of the suita-
bility of the publicity right for affording such protection. Sinatra v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 59 provides a particularly useful example.
Singer Nancy Sinatra had recorded a song, "These Boots Are Made for
Walkin'." Her version was distinguished by a special mode of dress
and delivery typified by high boots, a short skirt, and certain manner-
isms, and it became quite popular. Defendant Goodyear coined the
phrase "wide boots" as the theme for marketing a line of tires, and
secured a license from the copyright proprietor to use the song in its
advertising program. Goodyear contacted Sinatra hoping to employ
her to sing the song in defendant's radio and television commercials for
"wide boots" tires, but no agreement was reached. Goodyear neverthe-
less continued with the idea for the commercial, intentionally and ad-
mittedly60 imitating Sinatra's performance style by adopting the same
vocal arrangement, showing brief glimpses of an otherwise unrecogniz-
able woman dressed in clothes similar to Sinatra's costume, and hiring
a singer deliberately chosen on the basis of the similarity of her voice
and style to Sinatra's.
61
The court rejected Sinatra's unfair competition claim 62 and denied
any relief, resting its decision primarily on the reasoning that to allow
such a cause of action would interfere unduly with the exercise of the
rights belonging to the holder of the song's federal copyright. 63 Specifi-
58. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1148 (definitions 2a and 4a(2)) (1979).
59. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
60. This admission was made by the defendants, and assumed by the district court, for
purposes of defendants' motion for summary judgment. 435 F.2d at 713.
61. Liebig, supra note 57, at 41. Interestingly, Liebig represented the defendants in both
the Sinatra case and the Davis case discussed at notes 66-70 in/ra and accompanying text.
62. 435 F.2d at 714-16. For a discussion of the inadequacies of unfair competition the-
ory for protection of performance style, see notes 154-67 in/ra and accompanying text.
63. 435 F.2d at 717-18. The court relied specifically on the Sears-Compco preemption
doctrine. For a discussion of the doctrine and its possible application to the right of public-
ity see notes 108-19 in/ra and accompanying text.
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cally, the court foresaw a "clash with the copyright laws [in] the poten-
tial restriction which. . . [would be placed] upon the potential market
of the copyright proprietor" if plaintiff were granted the relief sought.64
Supposedly, proposed licensees would be completely discouraged if re-
quired to "pay each artist who has played or sung the composition and
who might therefore claim unfair competition-performer's protection
. . ,6. Such a conclusion clearly fails to recognize the simple fact
that by according the protection requested, a licensee would in no way
be prohibited from securing the rights to use the song, only from using
the distinctive expression of it as created by someone else. The licensee
would simply be forced to exercise a certain amount of creativity in
place of otherwise facile imitation.
More importantly, the facts of the Sinatra case give rise to the defi-
nite inference that the song alone was of no commercial value to the
defendant unless performed by Sinatra or someone imitating her. In
other words, it was the particular rendition of the song, as developed by
Sinatra, that was worth something to the defendants, yet they were able
to use it without compensating its creator.
A similar result obtained in Davis v. Trans World Airlines.66 In
that case the well-known singing group, The Fifth Dimension, objected
to the unauthorized imitation of their unique vocal sound and arrange-
ment as exhibited in their performance of the song "Up, Up and
Away." Although the song had also been recorded by more than thirty
others,67 the defendants purposefully chose to imitate the plaintiffs' ver-
sion specifically, in their use of the same song for radio and television
commercials. 6' The court, relying on the Sears-Compco preemption
doctrine,69 simply concluded that "imitation alone does not give rise to
a cause of action."7 The Davis case parallels Sinatra in that despite
the fact the copyright proprietor of the song had granted permission to
the defendants for the use of the song, no such license was granted to
copy the plaintiffs' unique and distinctive expression of the song, which
was obviously the creation of interest and value to the defendants.
64. 435 F.2d at 718.
65. Id.
66. 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
67. Liebig, supra note 57, at 41.
68. As in the Sinatra case, the defendants in Davis stipulated for purposes of the hearing
on their summary judgment motion that their broadcast commercials were imitative of the
plaintiffs' recorded performance of the song. 297 F. Supp. at 1146.
69. See notes 108-19 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sears-Compco
doctrine and its inapplicability to the right of publicity.
70. 297 F. Supp. at 1147.
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Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. ,7 another case involving inten-
tional voice imitation, was brought by the well-known actress Shirley
Booth, who had long played, and whose voice had become associated
with, the character "Hazel" in a television series. The originator and
copyright holder of the cartoon creation "Hazel" licensed the defend-
ants to use the cartoon character in laundry detergent commercials; but
in giving the cartoon character a voice for the first time, defendants
hired someone to do a voice-over imitation of Booth's voice as heard in
the "Hazel" television series.7 2 Again, however, the court held that
"the imitation by defendants of plaintiffs voice without more" was in-
sufficient to state a cause of action. 73 Booth is analogous to both Sina-
tra and Davis in that the subject matter of the license was apparently
valuable to the defendants only when accompanied by the distinctive
qualities provided by, and associated with, the respective plaintiffs.
74
71. 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
72. Id. at 345.
73. Id. at 347. But see Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937),
in which the plaintiff, known for her portrayal of "Aunt Jemima," brought suit against de-
fendants who broadcast radio commercials allegedly imitating the singing and dialogue
voices of "Aunt Jemima." The court said that the plaintiff "may be protected against coun-
terfeiting which deceives the public and perpetuates a fraud upon the public and her-
self. . . . [Defendant] would have no right to trade upon her reputation or to pass off an
imitation of her singing or form of entertainment which either caused deception, . . . or was
likely to do so." Id. at 895 (citations omitted). One court has distinguished Gardella solely
on the basis that it was decided prior to the Sears-Compco decisions. Sinatra v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d at 716 n. I1.
74. This type of situation, involved in Sinatra, Davis and Booth, in which the per-
former's distinctive rendition is the preeminent feature of a particular work, can be profita-
bly compared with certain established copyright law concepts. The first of these relates to
derivative works, which are those works "based upon one or more pre-existing works...
[and] which, as a whole, represent . . . original work[s] of authorship . . . ." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1976). Thus, any work which is substantially based on another work may be sepa-
rately copyrighted, if it does not itself constitute an infringement, and as long as it satisfies
the requirements of originality. NIMMER, supra note 55, § 3.01. The originality requirement
is satisfied by anything that renders the derivative work a "distinguishable variation" from
the prior work, id. § 3.03, and the protection- accorded a derivative work by copyright ex-
tends only to those original elements in the work, without altering whatsoever the scope of
protection accorded the pre-existing work. Id. § 3.04. Correspondingly, in the Sinatra, Da-
vir and Booth cases, the plaintiffs' performances were indeed based upon pre-existing works,
but included such original stylistic contributions so as to make them clearly distinguishable
from either the underlying work itself, or from other renditions of the same work. More-
over, any protection accorded to the specific efforts of the respective plaintiffs would not
have to have any effect on the rights of the proprietors of the underlying works.
A similar comparison can be drawn with the copyright protection of fictional charac-
ters. The issue there is whether a character can be protected independently of the work in
which that character appears. Although there is conflict on the issue, see generaly NIMMER,
supra note 55, § 2.12, the principle is most often stated to be that the more developed and
distinctive a character is, the more likely it can be copyrighted. Nichols v. Universal Pic-
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Performers have had somewhat greater success in situations in-
volving no underlying copyrighted work. For example, in Lahr v. Adell
Chemical Co. ," actor-comedian Bert Lahr brought suit against the pro-
ducer of a television commercial which featured a cartoon duck whose
voice imitated Lahr's unique voice and manner of comic delivery. The
appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Lahr's complaint,
recognizing that an anonymous imitation of his notorious vocal style
did, in fact, give rise to a cause of action for injury to his professional
reputation as an entertainer.
76
Finally, in the early case of Chaplin v. Amador," Charles Chaplin
tures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Even courts taking a more restrictive view of
the copyrightability of characters would grant protection to a character that "really consti-
tutes the story being told." Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954). By the same token, the performance styles of the Sinatra,
Davis and Booth plaintiffs were so developed and distinctive that they really constituted the
valuable element of the subject matter involved, evidenced by the defendants' deliberate
imitation of their styles. In other words, the principal appeal of the works to the defendants
lay with the plaintiffs' particular style and rendition, rather than the underlying piece itself.
Finally, copyright law also affords protection to the literal form of expression of a fac-
tual account, notwithstanding the unavailability of copyright protection for the facts them-
selves, as long as such literal form evidences some originality. NIMMER, supra note 55,
§ 2.11 [b]. Such protection prohibits verbatim or even closely paraphrased copying. Id.
Likewise, the Sinatra, Davis and Booth plaintiffs' original and distinctive forms of expres-
sing an existing work should be the subject of analogous safeguards, notwithstanding the
independent protection accorded to the underlying work.
In brief, the essential rationale supporting each of these copyright concepts applies
equally to unique and distinctive performance styles: that of protecting manifestations of
original and distinguishable intellectual creations. Nevertheless, for a discussion of the un-
availability of the copyright laws themselves for offering adequate protection for performers,
see notes 176-84 infra and accompanying text. See notes 84-86 infra and accompanying text
for a delineation of the type of protection advocated for performance style.
75. 300 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1962). Cf. Sim v. H.J. Heinz Co., [1959] 1 W.L.R. 313, in
which a well-known British actor with a readily identifiable voice sued to enjoin defendants
from using an alleged imitation of his voice in a commercial. An interlocutory injunction
was denied, but the court nevertheless concluded that it would be "a grave defect in the law
if it were possible for a party, for the purpose of commercial gain, to make use of the voice of
another party without his consent." Id. at 317.
76. 300 F.2d at 258. The court in Lahr'suggested that plaintiff's action could be based
on grounds of defamation ("A charge that an entertainer has stooped to perform below his
class may be found to damage his reputation." Id.) or unfair competition ("[P]laintiff here is
not complaining of imitation in the sense of simply copying his material or his ideas, but of
causing a mistake in identity. Such passing off is the basic offense." Id. at 259). For a
discussion of the general inadequacies of both of these theories of protection, see notes 172-
75 and 154-67 respectively, infra, and accompanying text.
Some commentators have labeled the Lahr decision as "inconclusive" because it was
decided prior to the Sears-Compco cases, Liebig, supra note 57, at 44, or because the court's
opinion only vacated the lower court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded for further
proceedings, Right of the Performing Artist, supra note 54, at 94.
77. 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
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sought to enjoin the defendant from appearing in a movie under the
name of "Charlie Aplin" and from imitating the make-up, dress, man-
nerisms and antics that the plaintiff had made famous in his characteri-
zation of the "Little Tramp". The court recognized Chaplin's portrayal
as the creation of a unique character expression,7" and acknowledged
his "right to be protected against those who would injure him by fraud-
ulent means; that is by counterfeiting his role . . . ,,9 and enjoined
the defendant "from imitating the plaintiff in such a way as will deceive
and defraud the public." °
Because it has rarely, if ever, been followed, the Chaplin case may
serve as a somewhat unreliable foundation for protection against style
imitation. It may simply represent the outside limitations to be placed
on imitation when it reaches the level of actually perpetrating a fraud
on the public. Nevertheless, the important factor shared by Chaplin
and the other cases discussed is that each involves "the admitted, delib-
erate appropriation by defendant of a vehicle, termed 'style,' through
which a character or idea was expressed by the plaintiff, without disclos-
ing to the public that defendant's 'expressor' was not the plaintiff."'
s
In addition, all of the cases, with the exception of Booth, have in
common the fact that the plaintiffs failed to rely on the right of public-
ity for protection. In Booth, the court did acknowledge the plaintiff's
allegation of a right of publicity violation, but succinctly rejected it,
reasoning that the right had to be supported by a showing that plain-
tiff's "name or a likeness was used by defendants. '8 2 Inasmuch as they
did not use either Booth's name or likeness, the commercials in ques-
tion were viewed by the court as anonymous, and the fact that the voice
was as readily identifiable as Booth's name or picture was irrelevant.
The court thus found no publicity right infringement.8 3
78. The court accepted the trial court's findings that
the plaintiff is the first person to use the said clothes. . . that he originated, com-
bined and perfected the manner of acting and mannerisms. .. mentioned herein
as used in motion pictures, and. . . that the plaintiff is the first person to originate,
use, combine and perfect. . . that certain form of acting, those mannerisms, facial
expressions and movements of his body ....
d. at 363, 269 P. at 545.
79. Id., 269 P. at 546.
80. Id. at 364, 269 P. at 546 (emphasis omitted).
81. Performer's Style, supra note 53, at 562 (emphasis in original).
82. 362 F. Supp. at 347.
83. Id. The.Booth court exhibited an obvious misconception of the nature of the right of
publicity, treating it merely as a theory on which to base a claim of unfair competition,
rather than as an independent legal right. There has been recurrent confusion of the public-
ity right as a form of the right of privacy (see notes 7-50 supra and accompanying text), but
the Booth court's misstatement appears to be a rather novel one.
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The right of publicity, if it is realistically to protect a performer's
proprietary interest in his or her personality, cannot be limited so liter-
ally to "name and likeness." The inevitable result of the unduly strict
construction employed by the Booth court, combined with the unavail-
ability of any viable alternative theory, prompts the advocation of the
following principle (originally suggested by a rather foresightful com-
mentator,14 but without any specific label), as the most expedient de-
lineation of the right of publicity:
Where A, without B's consent, makes an unconscionable use
of B's name, or any essential and identgfablepart of B's person-
ality for any purposes of his own and A's act has caused, or
will probably cause, injury to B's reputation, or loss to him in
his property, business or profession, ...85
A will be liable for infringing B's right of publicity. Such a rule would
finally give recognition to the fact that "[a] voice," and, it is submitted,
any other distinct personal trait or developed style, "which identqfes a
famous [person] as clearly as does his name or likeness . . . present[s]
simply another manifestation of personality that ought to be likewise
protected against commercial use."8 6
Application of this formulation to the foregoing fact situations re-
sults in the conclusion that in each case the plaintiffs' rights of publicity
were infringed upon. In each case, the performer created a unique
style, consisting of a single perfected characteristic or of a combination
of voice, gestures, and mannerisms; or the performer developed a form
of expressing his or her personality or some personal trait to the point
that it had a distinctive existence of its own and became identifiable by
the public. And in each case the defendant deliberately appropriated-
through imitation-that product of the plaintiffs professional efforts.
In the cases discussed above, the injury requirement of the sug-
gested standard was fulfilled. It is indisputable that the use of a promi-
nent performer's persona in connection with the promotion of
commercial products has great pecuniary value, as is the fact that the
prominence that permits such an economic return may have been
reached only after the performer has invested considerable expense, ef-
84. Comment, Torts-Libel-"Passing 0f' ofActor's Voice-Appropriation ofAnother's
Personality Without His Consent-An Equitable Right of Privacy?, 39 CAN. B. Ray. 409
(1960) [hereinafter cited as "Passing Off" of Actor's Voice].
85. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). The author therein concludes that protection should be
granted equitably through injunction, id., but not necessarily under the rubric of a right of
publicity. Id. at 431.
86. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commen-
tary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 253 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Netterville].
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fort, skill and time. 7 In each of the cases above, the defendant's unau-
thorized appropriation converted the pecuniary value in the plaintiff's
style to the defendant's own advantage, allowing him or her to acquire
the benefits of the performer's investment in him or herself.88
The specific injury to the plaintiff may consist of the denial of
compensation for the use of a creation for which plaintiff otherwise
would have been paid. This occurs in a situation in which the defend-
ant's actions have the effect of replacing the plaintiff who has been
divested of "the opportunity to exploit the valuable attributes of his for
her] public personality."8 9 Such an occurrence is undoubtedly com-
mon. It is surely a rare advertiser who would pay a prominent per-
former for a product endorsement when the benefit of the performer's
supposed association with the product can be gained at a much lower
cost by imitating him or her. The current law provides no deterrent to
such a course of action. Additionally, the unauthorized use may injure
the future earning capacity of the performer in a number of ways: by
precluding future endorsements of the performer's choice, such as those
that would conflict with products the performer had previously been
associated with involuntarily by virtue of the defendant's actions; by
over-exposing the plaintiff so as to impede his or her career; or by asso-
ciating the plaintiff with an inferior or questionable product, thereby
implying an endorsement of that product,90 with the probable concomi-
tant damage to his or her professional reputation.91 Finally, and most
- 87. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790, 340 N.Y.S. 2d
144, 146 (Sup. Ct.), afr'das modifted, 42 A.D. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 17 (1973); Nimmer,
supra note 1, at 215-16.
88. The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straightforward one of
preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served
by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have
market value and for which he would normally pay.
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 326, 331 (1966), cited in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
576 (1977). See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch.
1967).
89. Netterville, supra note 86, at 274. This type of injury was especially evident in the
Sinatra case, in that it was clear that the defendants were originally interested in securing
Sinatra's employment, but were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement with her. 435 F.2d at
713.
90. See Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories,
51 TEx. L. REv. 637, 642-47 (1973). The author therein predicates his argument for protec-
tion of public figures from unauthorized product endorsement primarily upon the effects of
such conduct on the public. See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 836 n. 11,
603 P.2d 425, 439 n. 11, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 337 n. 11 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
91. This type of injury to one's professional reputation is to be distinguished from the
type involved in the Lahr case, discussed at note 76 supra and accompanying text. In Lahr,
the very fact of a performer's apparent association with an advertisement was thought to
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importantly, an infringement of a performer's right of publicity via imi-
tation of style violates the performer's "right to enjoy the fruits of his
own industry,"92 as well as the right of exclusive control over the ex-
ploitation of the publicity values he or she has created,93 and hence
over his or her very means of livelihood.94
The courts in the Sinatra, Davis, and Booth cases unfortunately
failed to recognize any need for protecting a performer's style and per-
sonality traits. Rather, they considered themselves bound by the judi-
cial stricture that "[limitation alone does not give rise to a cause of
action." ' In none of these cases, however, did the court offer any judi-
cial precedence for this statement,96 which is equally void of legal rea-
soning. The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, has
provided reasoning that compels a contrary conclusion, by drawing a
very appropriate parallel between the right of publicity and patent and
copyright laws. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Ho ward Broadcasting Co. ,9 the
Court noted that intellectual property is protected under patent and
copyright laws pursuant to "the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts,' "98 and declared that the right of publicity has the same purpose.
harm his/her reputation by implying that he/she was forced to accept supposedly inferior
means of employment. On the other hand, in the type of situation referred to here, there is
not necessarily any disparagement stemming solely from the performer's ostensible activity
in commercials, but rather from the impression that the performer has sold his/her identity
for that particular product or purpose.
92. Uhiaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. at 1282.
93. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 216.
94. Peaformer'r Style, supra note 53, at 591.
95. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d at 713; Davis v. Trans World
Airlines, 297 F. Supp. at 1147; see Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. at 347.
96. It has been aptly noted that "[s]uch . . .language can have its genesis in a first
decision, be quoted and followed by successive decisions, and ultimately become the 'law of
the land' even though the original language is devoid of legal support or reasoning." Duft &
Dorr, Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights and Unfair Competition 52 DEN. L.J. 313, 321 (1975).
It might be presumed, however, that the courts somehow deduced the statement from
the Sears-Compco doctrine, in that the doctrine was often discussed in conjunction with the
statement. But such a remark taken out of context, as it was here, can frequently lead to a
distorted statement of the law. Specifically, the premise attributed to the Sears-Compco de-
cisions should be clarified by noting that imitation does not give rise to a cause of action
only if the subject matter copied is susceptible to protection by copyright or patent law, but
is not so protected. On the other hand, where a protected work is involved, imitation is
expressly what gives rise to liability. See note 100 infra and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the Sears-Compco doctrine and the fact that it does not hamper the
right of publicity, see notes 108-19 infra and accompanying text.
97. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
98. Id. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
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The Court recognized that the publicity right, like the patent and copy-
right laws, offers protection that provides a strong incentive to make the
investment, in terms of time and creative effort, to develop the talents
and qualities necessary for public recognition and prestige.99 A natural
corollary to the analogy between the copyright laws and the publicity
right is the refutation of the Sinatra, Davis and Booth courts' holdings.
Under present copyright law, it is precisely an imitation of a copy-
righted work-one that shows merely a "substantial similarity" to the
protected work-that gives rise to a cause of action for copyright in-
fringement.100 By parity of analysis, the deliberate imitation of a per-
former's unique style or personality trait that is protected by the
publicity right should give rise to an analogous cause of action.
The Sinatra,'10 Booth,'1 2 and Lahr t°3 courts all expressed concern
about the difficulties to be encountered by the courts in according pro-
tection to performers' styles. It has similarly been argued that it would
be impossible for the courts to establish practicable standards for eval-
uating possible liability in imitation cases.' 4 The analogy to the body
of copyright law is also instructive in this regard. From the copyright
perspective, in determining whether the "substantial similarity" stan-
dard has been met, the courts normally rely on an "ordinary observer"
test, which asks "whether an average lay observer would recognize the
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
99. Id. at 576-77. In Zacchini, the right of publicity was actually applied to the appro-
priation of a performer's entire act (a news broadcast of the plaintiffs "human cannonball"
act), rather than to his name, likeness or personality.
One commentator has suggested that in terms of the copyright-publicity right analogy,
a distinction must be drawn between performance infringement, as involved in Zacehini,
and the more "traditional" right of publicity. Note, State "Copyright" Protection/or Per-
formers." The First Amendment Quesdion, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1198, 1221 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as State "Copyright" Protection/or Performers]. This author submits, however, that it
is a distinction without a difference. The protection accorded by both the copyright laws
and the right of publicity, whether applied to an entire performance or only a distinctive
element thereof, promotes creativity and safeguards a performer's means of livelihood.
100. The case law on this test is extensive. For a survey thereof and specific citations, see
NIMMER, supra note 55, § 13.03 [A]. Although the test is not specified in the New Copyright
Act, which took effect January 1, 1978, this standard was clear under the Old Act, and it
seems unlikely that it has changed.
101. 435 F.2d at 718.
102. 362 F. Supp. at 347.
103. 300 F.2d at 259.
104. Liebig, supra note 57, at 46. See also Comment, The Rights ofPerformers in the New
Copyright Act and Beyond, 30 FED. COM. L.J. 149, 169 (1978), [hereinafter cited as The
Rights ofPerformers] ("If novelty or some special kind of merit were required for the origi-
nal performance to obtain protection, the courts would be involved in artistic criticism and
evaluation, tasks which they are ill-equipped to perform.").
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work."'' 5 Applying the same criterion to style protection should re-
solve the doubts expressed by the courts. Specifically, if the ordinary
individual either listened to an otherwise anonymous voice imitation
and recognized it as that of a celebrity, or viewed a performance utiliz-
ing the unique mannerisms, gestures and dress associated with a partic-
ular performer and recognized it as a copy of that performer, then style
appropriation would be found,1°6 and the performer's right of ,publicity
would be found to have been violated. The deliberate imitation of a
performer's unique style is as perceptible to the "ordinary observer" as
is any imitation giving rise to a copyright infringement action. In other
words, inasmuch as "there has been little difficulty in establishing tests
for judging the existence of infringement in other artistic areas, style
should be no exception if viewed in its most elementary form-the
work product of creative effort,"' 7 and if protected by the right of pub-
licity as delineated above. Moreover, the mere fact that the rule advo-
cated may ultimately be difficult to apply in no way lessens the
deservedness of the protection it would afford.
IV. OVERCOMING CONFLICTING LEGAL DOCTRINES
A. Federal Preemption
In the Sinatra, Davis, and Booth cases, a major stumbling block to
the plaintiffs' attempts to obtain protection for performance style was
the courts' reliance on the preemption doctrine, emanating from the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 108 and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. ."9 These two cases held that
works that are not protected by federal copyright or patent laws are not
otherwise protectible by state law. Inasmuch as the creative efforts of
Sinatra, Booth and The Fifth Dimension were not subject to copyright
law, the courts reasoned that the plaintiffs could not look to state law
for protection." 0
Nevertheless, this contention is no longer tenable, as illustrated by
105. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 194 U.S.P.Q. 347, 350 (1977)
(quoting United Merchants Mfg., Inc. v. K. Gimbel Accessories, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 151, 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) and Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)).
106. Performer'r Style, supra note 53, at 573.
107. Id. at 574. The author therein concludes, however, that the proper means for pro-
tecting performance style is copyright law. For a contrary conclusion, see notes 167-75 infra
and accompanying text.
108. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
109. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
110. For a discussion of the inadequacies of copyright law in protecting performance
style, see notes 176-84 infra and accompanying text.
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two subsequent Supreme Court decisions."' In Goldstein v. Califor-
nia 12 (involving copyright law), and Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron
Corp. 113 (involving patent law), the Court, while not expressly overrul-
ing Sears-Compco, rejected an interpretation of the doctrine that would
require the preemption of all state laws granting protection analogous
to the copyright and patent laws. Instead the Court recognized that
common law schemes of protection, where not expressly or by obvious
implication preempted by federal law, do play a legitimate role, con-
current with federal law, in protecting intellectual property.' "4 More
significantly, any remaining doubt on this issue was resolved by the
Zacchini decision, in which the Court, citing both Goldstein and
Kewanee, specifically acknowledged the legitimacy of the right of pub-
licity and stated that "[t]he Constitution does not prevent [a state] from
... deciding to protect the entertainer's incentive in order to en-
courage the production of this type of work.""''5
In addition, the New Copyright Act" 6 supports the conclusion
that the right of publicity is unhampered by the preemption doctrine.
The Act eliminates the former distinction between common law copy-
right and federal stautory copyright by providing that the federal copy-
right laws will preempt all legal and equitable rights that are the
equivalent of federal copyright.' ' But the preemption provisions con-
tain exceptions that allow states to provide statutory or common law
111. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
112. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). In Goldstein, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Cali-
fornia penal statute prohibiting the piracy of sound recordings which, at that time, were not
subject to federal copyright protection:
[W]here Congress determines that neither federal protection nor freedom from
restraint is required by the national interest, it is at liberty to stay its hands entirely.
Since state regulation would not then conflict with federal action, total relinquish-
ment of the State's power to grant copyright protection cannot be inferred.
Id. at 559.
113. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). The Kewanee case upheld the validity of Ohio's trade secret
law. The Court stated that "[t]he only limitation on the States is that in regulating the area
of patents and copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area
passed by Congress .... Id. at 479.
114. Not only does Goldstein offer the opportunity to states for "tailor-made" legisla-
tion dependent upon individual needs, it also gives the unique opportunity to test
the feasibility of copyright protection in new areas on a localized basis without
resort to federal copyright protection until such time as interpretative case law
emerges. In particular, New York and California, as centers of the entertainment
industry are presented with a challenge to respond to the needs of those "authors"
of "style" which heretofore have gone unheard.
Peformer'r Style, supra note 53 at 579 n.57 (citing Kaul, AndNow, State Protection of Intel-
lectual Property?, 60 A.B.A.J. 198, 202 (1974)).
115. 433 U.S. at 577. See notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text.
116. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-702 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
117. Id., § 301.
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protection for non-copyrightable subject matter,118 and the House
Committee Report specifically includes the right of publicity among
those state causes of action that were not intended to be preempted.'
19
Thus, the courts' holdings in Sinatra, Davis, and Booth, at least insofar
as they rely on the Sears-Compco preemption doctrine, should no
longer be considered authoritative.
B. Parody, Mimicry, and Satire
On cursory examination, the proposition advanced herein, that a
performer's unique style and personality traits should be protected
under the rubric of the right of publicity, would seem rather outrageous
if applied too broadly so as to preclude the imitation of distinctive per-
formance style for purposes of pure entertainment. Therefore it must
be emphasized that it is not this form of imitation that should be the
subject of inquiry; instead, a distinction must be drawn between appro-
priation for commercial (advertising) purposes and entertainment
uses. 120
The concepts of parody, mimicry, and satire, in the appropriate
circumstances, should be regarded as exemptions from the publicity
right advocated. They are analogous to the fair use doctrine in copy-
right law, which establishes the basic principle that a copyright is not
infringed, nor damages assessed or further copying enjoined, if the
copyrighted material is used in a fair and reasonable manner. 21 The
doctrine is generally accepted as a defense to copyright infringement
when the allegedly infringing acts are deemed to be outside the legiti-
mate scope of protection afforded copyright owners. 22 Similarly, fair
118. Id., § 301(b)-301(c).
119. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT].
120. One commentator has observed that the distinction may not always be justified, and
that even purely entertainment purposes may also be actionable where a continuing, as op-
posed to sporadic, use is made so as to divest the performer of the opportunity to fully
exploit the valuable attributes of his or her persona. Netterville, supra note 86, at 254.
121. See, e.g., H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 125 (1944).
The judicially created doctrine of fair use has been given statutory recognition in the New
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107, but the House Committee Report relative to this section
expresses the intention to restate the judicial doctrine, and "not to change, narrow, or en-
large it in any way." HousE REPORT, supra note 119, at 66.
122. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Cal. 1955) (involving a burlesque of the movie "From Here to Eternity" entitled
"From Here to Obscurity"); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964) (involving Mad Magazine's parodies of the lyrics of plaintiffs
songs). Cf. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aqfd sub nom Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), af'dby an equally
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and reasonable instances of parody, mimicry or satire may be deemed
to be outside the legitimate scope of protection to be accorded by the
publicity right.
Imitation, in the form of mimicry, parody or satire, is an exercise
of the mimic's or humorist's own developed talents. 23 The distinction
has been appropriately explained as follows: "[W]here the imitation is
of another's unique performance, actions, gestures, tones, etc., and
where the imitator's own excellence of talent contributes materially to
the acceptability of the imitation and where the imitation is done in
good faith, the imitation is not an example of literary larceny,"' 2 4 and
thus, would not constitute a right of publicity violation.
The problem encountered, of course, is determining where to draw
the line between permissible and infringing imitation. Again, reference
to copyright law is instructive. In the majority of cases involving the
fair use doctrine, the dispositive issue concerns the extent to which the
potential demand for the plaintifi's protected work has been decreased
by the defendant's use.'25 Likewise, in imitation cases the determina-
tive factor may be whether or not the imitating performance has the
effect of replacing the plaintiff, 26 that is, whether the imitator is acting
as a substitute for the plaintiff' 27 or lessening the demand for him or
her.
Alternatively, it has variously been suggested that the test for es-
tablishing liability should be whether it is made to appear that there is
an actual association between the plaintiff and imitating perform-
ance,128 or simply whether the imitator is "'flying under his own ban-
divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958), in which Jack Benny's burlesque version of the movie
"Gas Light" was found to involve such a substantial taking of plaintiffs copyrighted work as
to constitute an infringement.
123. See Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
124. Netterville, supra note 86, at 249.
125. KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 7, at 425. See, e.g., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,
329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964) ("[Where. . . the parody has
neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original . . . a finding of
[copyright] infringement would be improper."). In Berlin, for example, the court noted that
"Louella Schwartz Describes Her Malady" would not be a likely substitute for a potential
patron of "A Pretty Girl Is Like a Melody." 329 F.2d at 543.
The New Copyright Act codifies this principle by including as a factor to be considered
in determining whether a use is fair, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). See generally NIMMER, supra note 55,
§ 13.05[B].
126. Netterville, supra note 86, at 274.
127. The Sinatra case provides a good example of this, inasmuch as the defendants
therein had tried to employ the plaintiff before resorting to a singer who could imitate her.
435 F.2d at 713.
128. "Passing OJ" of Actor's Voice, supra note 84, at 425.
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ner.' "1129 It would also seem quite appropriate to inquire into the
defendant's motives for the allegedly infringing act.' 30 Regardless of
the test applied, however, recognition of imitation in the form of par-
ody, mimicry or satire, where the imitator acts in good faith, as an in-
dependent creative effort properly distinguishes it from those cases in
which the originating performer is, in fact, injured in one or more of
the manners discussed above.'
3'
C. The First Amendment
Although the first amendment was not raised as an issue in any of
the cases reviewed earlier, and has not been examined in other public-
ity cases as often as one might expect, the possibility of conflict between
the right of publicity and the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and press 32 must be at least briefly confronted. 133
Courts have generally agreed that the publication of news con-
cerning a public figure cannot be restrained by an assertion of the right
of publicity.' 34 By contrast, however, the use of a performer's name,
likeness, or style to enhance commercial advertising conveys neither
information nor ideas and contributes virtually nothing to the promo-
tion of first amendment values.1 31 Indeed, it is difficult to find "as any
129. Netterville, supra note 86, at 250.
130. Such an inquiry would be analogous to the first factor specified in the New Copy-
right Act as a guideline in the determination of fair use: "[T]he purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes." 17 U.S.C. app. § 107(l) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
131. See notes 87-94 supra and accompanying text.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
133. For more thorough discussions of the relationship between the first amendment and
the right of publicity, see Kulzick & Hogue, Chilled Bird- Freedom of Expression in the Eigh-
ties, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 57 (1980), Performer's Right of Publicity, supra note 7, and State
"Copyright" Protectionfor Performers, supra note 99.
134. "[Tlhe 'right of publicity' [must] bow where such conflicts with the free dissemina-
tion of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public interest." Rosemont En-
terprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct.
1968), aJ'dmem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969). This position receives additional
support from the accurate observation that "[iun the news broadcasting situation, plaintiff is
not possessed of any property right. . . ." KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 7, at 459. Cf.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
135. But see Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup.
Ct. 1968), in which the court held that publication of a poster featuring the plaintiff, a well-
known comedian, in a satirical presidential campaign was constitutionally protected because
it was "newsworthy and of public interest." Id. at 449, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507. Cf Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979)
(poster commemorating Elvis Presley's death not privileged).
It should also be noted that the assertion that the enhancement of advertising conveys
no information differs from the proposition that commercial advertising itself conveys no
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protected first amendment right a privilege to usurp the benefits of the
creative and artistic talent, technical skills, and investment necessary to
produce a. . .performance."'
' 36
Once again, any doubt on this issue was resolved by the Zacchini
decision, in which the Supreme Court held that the first amendment
does not prohibit a state from finding the news broadcast of a per-
former's entire act to be a right of publicity infringement. 37 Thus,
even assuming a direct clash between the publicity right and the first
amendment, the competing interests may weigh in favor of the former.
On one hand, the state's interest in protecting the performer's economic
stake in his or her performance and publicity values would, in the long
run, promote the public's first amendment interest in access to en-
tertainment. 38  On the other hand, the Court reasoned, the first
amendment interests of the news media and the public in the free dis-
semination of information would not be served by allowing a defend-
ant to enrich himself unjustly by appropriating a performer's creative
efforts. '
39
Moreover, the Court impliedly accepted the proposition that en-
forcement of the right of publicity does not necessarily place any re-
straints on the dissemination of information, inasmuch as a defendant
can invariably convey the same idea or concept in another way that
does not violate another's publicity right.140 In fact, it has been aptly
information of public interest. Not only is the latter contention simply untrue, but the
Supreme Court clearly refuted such a contention in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1975).
136. United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
137. 433 U.S. 562, 569-79 (1977).
138. Id. at 578. Additionally, in cases where a performer's name, likeness or style has
been appropriated for advertisement or endorsement purposes, remedies provided by the
right of publicity "may guard against the dissemination of false and misleading advertising,"
thus promoting first amendment values in another sense. State "Copyright" Protection for
Performers, supra note 99, at 1221 n.121.
139. 433 U.S. at 578.
140. Id. at 577-78 n.13. See also Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). The Grant case involved an interesting fact situation. In 1946, a photograph of Cary
Grant was used with his consent by defendant, a magazine publisher, in connection with an
article on celebrities' wardrobe and personal habits. In 1971, the magazine contained an
article about the clothing styles of the seventies. Without obtaining Grant's consent, the
defendant used the head from Grant's 1946 picture superimposed over the body of an un-
named model in modem apparel. The defendant contended that Grant's lawsuit (which
included a cause of action for violation of his right of publicity) was barred by the first
amendment. Id. at 878. The court rejected the argument, noting that if a publisher wants to
trade upon a celebrity's name and reputation, it is free to do so, as long as it pays "the going
rate for such benefit." Id. at 883. Furthermore, the court stated:
With respect to any possible chilling effect . . . the Court can take judicial
notice that there is no shortage of celebrities who-for an appropriate fee-are
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suggested that the Zacchini decision may require "that any appropria-
tion must be avoided if the underlying idea can be effectively conveyed
in some alternative manner without diminishing the pecuniary value of
name and likeness."' 41 Indeed, such a requirement, if construed more
broadly so as to give equal recognition to the pecuniary value of a per-
former's style and distinctive traits, would be a very appropriate means
of enforcing the right of publicity as advocated in this Comment.
V. INADEQUACIES OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF PROTECTION
The proposition that the right of publicity is the proper means for
protecting performance style is reinforced by the fact that traditional
legal theories have simply been proven inadequate. With rare excep-
tion, "'42 both the courts and litigants have attempted to deal with the
problem of style protection by relying on conventional causes of action;
but in doing so they were "[grasping] at old straws to solve novel
problems."' 143 By contrast, application of the right of publicity would
serve to fill in the gaps, and avoid the limitations of, alternative theo-
ries.
A. Right of Privacy
Among the cases discussed earlier, only the plaintiff in Lahr as-
serted an invasion of privacy.'" Nevertheless, litigants seeking protec-
tion of their (more traditional) publicity values have frequently relied
on the privacy doctrine, and thus their efforts have frequently been
hampered.
The inherent distinctions between the rights of publicity and pri-
vacy that render the privacy theory inadequate, especially the differ-
only too happy to lend their faces, names and reputations for exploitations in such
enterprises as the one here involved....
... [T]he First Amendment does not absolve movie companies-or publish-
ers-from the obligation of paying their help. They are entitled to photograph
newsworthy events, but they are not entitled to convert unsuspecting citizens into
unpaid professional actors.
Id. at 883-84 (footnotes omitted). Thus, Grant also seems to support the conclusion that
even though a performer's name, likeness or identity is used in a "news medium," this fact
alone does not render the publicity right's protection inapplicable. Protection for Public
Figures, supra note 15, at 551.
141. Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 4, at 772.
142. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
143. Netterville, supra note 86, at 252.
144. 300 F.2d at 257. The court quickly disposed of the claim: "We see no profit in
exploring [the privacy] alternative and, if anything, thornier path." Id. at 258.
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ences between the interests each theory protects,1 45 the personal, rather
than proprietary, nature of privacy, 146 and the respective measures of
damages, 147 are discussed more fully in section II above. But in addi-
tion, other concepts normally associated with the right of privacy em-
phasize its unsuitability for style protection. The most important of
these is the principle of waiver, which holds that the very fact of being
a celebrity means that that person "'has dedicated his life to the public
and thereby waived his right to privacy.' ",148 Thus, a plaintiff may be
deemed to have consented to the invasion of privacy either expressly or
by conduct demonstrating that he or she was actually seeking public-
ity. 149 Even though most courts have adopted a more limited construc-
tion of waiver by affording protection to the aspects of a celebrity's
private and non-professional life that are not made public, 50 this offers
no comfort to the performer seeking protection from the appropriation
of those personal attributes that, by definition, have not only been
made public but have probably been widely promoted. The waiver
doctrine, therefore, "presents a very real obstacle to the protection by a
well known personality of the publicity values which often constitute
an important part of his assets."'1
5'
Additionally, many courts continue to apply the Restatement Sec-
ond of Torts rule that requires an intrusion to be patently offensive
before an invasion of privacy action will lie.'5 2 Accordingly, because
most of the appropriation that performers seek to prevent cannot be
considered offensive or beyond the bounds of decency, 153 however up-
setting it may be to the plaintiff, this rule also contributes to the inade-
quacy of the right of privacy as a source of performance style
protection.
B. Unfair Competition/Misappropriation
The common law theory of unfair competition (and, within the
145. See notes 17-31 supra and accompanying text.
146. See notes 33-40 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
148. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 204 (quoting Yankwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 499 (1952)).
149. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 817. See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942) and Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354,
107 N.E.2d 485 (1952), discussed at notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
150. KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 7, at 453.
151. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 206.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976). See Nimmer, supra note 1, at
207 (although Professor Nimmer was citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939)).
153. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 207.
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same category, misappropriation) 54 has been the primary source of re-
liance for performers seeking protection, and was invoked by the plain-
tiffs in the Sinatra, Davis, Booth and Lahr cases. Those cases
exemplify the limits of unfair competition relief available to plaintiffs
seeking protection for style.
First, an action for unfair competition traditionally requires a
showing of actual competition between the plaintiff and defendant; but
such competition rarely exists between performers and defendant ap-
propriators. 155 Although the Lahr court did not regard the absence of
competition as significant, 156 the courts in both Booth 1
57 and Sinatra 5 8
emphasized this factor in rejecting the plaintiffs' unfair competition
claims.
Second, an unfair competition claim generally requires an addi-
tional showing of passing-off (or palming-off),' 59 which consists of
making false representations to the public that induce them to believe
that the defendant's goods or services are those of the plaintiff. Such a
showing is established by proof of the mere likelihood of confusion or
deception. 60 In spite of the apparent applicability of this concept to
the cases in question, and even though it was unnecessary for the plain-
tiffs to prove any fraudulent intent on the part of the defendants, 16 1 this
154. The misappropriation doctrine originated in the case of International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), which held that the plaintiff news-gatherer could be
protected against the appropriation of their news releases by a competing news agency. The
Court found a "quasi-property" right in the product of the plaintiffs efforts, and said that
the defendant's appropriation of those efforts represented an attempt to "reap where it has
not sown" and thus constituted unfair competition. Id. at 236, 239.
The International News Service (INS) theory of misappropriation has been the source
of much controversy. One court has stated that the INS case was overruled by the Sears-
Compco decisions. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318-19
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). On the other hand, another court has read the
Goldstein decision as reviving INS and the misappropriation doctrine. Mercury Record
Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163, 171, 218 N.W.2d 705, 713 (1974),
appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 914 (1975).
Regardless, the misappropriation doctrine needs to be acknowledged, and inasmuch as
it is basically an "offshoot of the general law of unfair competition," 1 J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:23, at 318, it is discussed within the rubric of
unfair competion.
155. KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 7, at 457; Nimmer, supra note 1, at 210-11.
156. 300 F.2d at 259.
157. 362 F. Supp. at 348.
158. "There is no competition between Nancy Sinatra and Goodyear Tire Company.
Appellant is not in the tire business and Goodyear is not selling phonograph records." 435
F.2d at 714.
159. KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 7, at 457; Nimmer, supra note 1, at 212.
160. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 957-58.
161. Id. at 958.
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requirement also proved to be a significant obstacle to the plaintiffs'
relief. Again, the courts in Sinatra 162 and Davis163 found that there had
been no passing-off by the defendants because it had not been shown
that the defendants tried to mislead the public into believing that the
commercials in question were the products of the plaintiffs. Neither
court, however, recognized the irrelevance of the presence or absence of
such intent to mislead, nor did they comment on the possibility that the
public may have been deceived, notwithstanding any finding of a lack
of intent on the defendant's part. Even so, it seems particularly ironic
to state that there had been no passing-off when, in fact, the defendants
had intentionally and admittedly imitated the respective plaintiffs.I64
Beyond that, it has been noted that the passing off requirement,
and with it, the unfair competition theory in general, is inappropriately
applied to publicity right cases because the pecuniary values involved
may be usurped even without any passing-off by the defendant.' 65 Ad-
ditionally, even though there has been a liberalizing trend in the area of
unfair competition, so that recovery will not automatically be denied in
the absence of either a competitive atmosphere or passing off,16 6 the
absence of both requirements will probably defeat an unfair competi-
162. 435 F.2d at 714.
163. 297 F. Supp. at 1147.
164. See notes 60-61 and 68 supra and accompanying text.
165. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 212. One commentator distinguishes misappropriation
from unfair competition in this regard, stating that the misappropriation doctrine dispenses
with the palming-off requirement, and concludes that there are thus no difficulties encoun-
tered in applying the doctrine to situations in which the performer has created the expression
of a character. Performer's Style, supra note 53, at 585-86. Even accepting the lesser re-
quirements of misappropriation, the doctrine remains unsuitable because "a cause of action
grounded on misappropriation must allege direct competition with the plaintiff by the use of
plaintiff's appropriated materials." Note, Misappropriation: A Retreatfrom the Federal Pat-
ent and Copyright Preemption Doctrine, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 239, 241 (1974). Thus, it is on
the same level as general unfair competition theory in terms of inadequacy for style protec-
tion purposes. Furthermore, it has been noted that misappropriation is the state common
law action most likely to be limited by the New Copyright Act's preemption provisions, The
Rights ofPerformers, supra note 104, at 159 n.69, despite the fact that the Copyright Act
states that it is not to annul or limit "any rights or remedies under the common law or
statutes of any State with respect to-activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified."
17 U.S.C. app. § 301(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Interestingly, this section of the Act as
reported in the HousE REPORT, supra note 119, at 24, specifically provided that the right left
unaffected included "rights against misappropriation not equivalent to any such exclusive
rights" as specified in the Act. See generally, NIMMER, supra note 55, § 1.01[B][I].
166. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), preliminary injunction aj'dper curlam, 279
A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). In that case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant
from recording performances of the Metropolitan Opera broadcast over the air and distrib-
uting those recordings. The court noted that neither palming off nor actual competition
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tion cause of action. 167
Finally, even assuming that the requirements of passing off and
actual competition do not thwart an unfair competition claim, another
attribute of the theory may have the same effect. Generally, under un-
fair competition law (and as one branch of it, trademark law), the right
to use a name can only be assigned as an appurtenance to the sale of
the business and good will with which that name has become so associ-
ated 68 as to have acquired a secondary meaning serving to indicate the
were prerequisites to an unfair competition claim, 199 Misc. at 795-96, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 491-
92, and stated that:
The modem view as to the law of unfair competition does not rest solely on
the ground of direct competitive injury, but on the broader principle that property
rights of commercial value are to be and will be protected from any form of unfair
invasion or infringement and from any form of commercial immorality ....
199 Misc. at 796, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
Such broad language would seemingly support the contention that unfair competition
theory can and should render all the protection necessary. But the court's statement was
actually dicta, since both passing-off and competition were found to exist as a matter of fact.
Moreover, the plaintiff in Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. at 345, relied on the
Metropolitan Opera case, but the court distinguished it as involving a direct appropriation
rather than limitation. Finally, Nimmer has pointed out that the language used by the court
is simply too uncertain to have any practical application. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 214.
167. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 213. But see Shaw v. Time-Life Recprds, 38 N.Y.2d 201,
379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975). In Shaw, the plaintiff brought an unfair competition action alleg-
ing that a re-creation of a big band era performance style could be proven at a trial to create
a false impression that the original bandleader had participated in the recording (thereby
constituting passing-off), even though the infringing product was actually labeled truthfully.
The Shaw court took a broad view of misappropriation, finding an occurrence of unfair
competition by showing only that the misappropriation had been engaged in, and that the
plaintiff had been injured. Id. at 206-07, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
168. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 212. The effect of this principle, as well as the
problems to be encountered by reliance on unfair competition theory, is exemplified by the
decision in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979), discussed in note 36 supra. The Lugosi court suggested that the only way to protect
one's publicity values was through the establishment of a business:
Lugosi could have created during his lifetime through the commercial exploitation
of his name, face and/or likeness in connection with the operation of any kind of
business or the sale of any kind of product or service a general acceptance and
good will for such business, product or service among the public, the effect of
which would have been to impress such business, product or service with a secon-
dary meaning, protectable under the law of unfair competion. . . . The tie-up of
one's name, face and/or likeness with a business, product or service creates a tangi-
ble and saleable product ....
Id. at 818, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (citation omitted).
Since Lugosi had not created such a business, the publicity value of his name, likeness
and identity were afforded no protection. Had the court accepted the right of publicity as a
doctrine distinct from either privacy or unfair competition law, and acknowledged the fact
that one's name, likeness and identity are very saleable products even when not "tied-up"
with a particular business, the result would most assuredly have been different.
See also Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in
which plaintiffs secondary meaning theory was rejected.
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origin of the business' products. 169 But most performers' publicity val-
ues have been established, not in connection with a particular business,
but rather through the efforts expended over the course of many per-
formances and appearances.' 70 Inasmuch as these values are tremen-
dously restricted if they cannot be effectively assigned,' 7 1 this factor
enforces the conclusion that unfair competition theory remains an un-
satisfactory means of protection for performers.
C Defamation
The theory of defamation 172 may also be available to performers,
at least where the defendant has created the impression that the plain-
tiff has been forced to accept performance opportunities below an ac-
ceptable status. This was essentially the holding of the Lahr court. 73
But inasmuch as not all appropriations are disparaging, a defamation
claim will provide inadequate protection if it is upheld only when the
performer's attributes are used in an offensive manner.17 4 The Booth
court apparently recognized this when it rejected a claim similar to
Lahr's based on the observation that commercial endorsements by per-
formers are quite commonplace and no longer necessarily imply any
diminution in talent. 7 1 (There are undoubtedly performers who would
vigorously disagree with this conclusion, however.)
A defamation claim is even more tenuous when it is based on the
allegedly inferior quality of the imitation of the plaintiff. This type of
allegation may actually refute the plaintiff's claim that the imitation is
so similar to plaintiff's unique style as to deceive the public regarding
its originator. Absent such a confusion of identity there could be no
defamation. On the other hand, the possibility does exist that the imi-
tation is sufficiently similar to the original performance as to cause con-
fusion, but is obviously inferior in quality. In this admittedly
implausible situation it would seem that a claim for defamation may be
asserted.
169. KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 7, at 237.
170. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 213.
171. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
172. Defamation as referred to herein can be defined as "that which tends to injure 'repu-
tation' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which
the plaintiff is held." PROSSER, supra note 13, at 739.
173. "A charge that an entertainer has stooped to perform below his class may be found
to damage his reputation." 300 F.2d at 258.
174. Nimmer, supra note I, at 215.
175. 362 F. Supp. at 349.
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D. Federal Copyright Law
Although one commentator has argued extensively that perform-
ance style can, and should, qualify for copyright protection, 76 such a
conclusion is questionable. To the contrary, copyright law does not
provide a viable alternative to the type of protection advocated herein.
The copyright clause of the Constitution limits the scope of federal
copyright to "writings" of "authors."'' 77 While the term "writings" has
been construed quite broadly in case law,' 78 the New Copyright Act
protects only those works fixed in a tangible form. 179 It has been sug-
gested that "[t]angibility requirements can be met by registering tapes
of voice or video tapes of the gestures, mannerisms, and style of dress
involved in the expression."' 80 This theory does seem commendable,
especially because the registration of those tangibles would carry with
it the added benefit of providing "an objective standard by which [an]
alleged infringement. . . could be judged."'' But the New Copyright
Act prevents the realization of this proposal in that the law was specifi-
cally intended to subject performance to protection only under state
common law or statute.'
82
Upon further consideration, the possibility of "fixing" a per-
former's identity appears not only improbable, but also inadvisable.
The right of publicity protects intangible proprietary interests and in-
tangible creative efforts. These intangibles may gain their value as a
result of one's originative intellectual investment, like the tangible
works protected by copyright law; but the true publicity value gener-
ated thereby is simply not fixed in a tangible form, and cannot be so
fixed.' 83 "To conclude that the right of publicity is subject to congres-
sional regulation under the copyright clause is to find that not only an
author's writings, but also his mind, are subject to such control. Such a
176. Performer's Style, supra note 53, at 569-76.
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
178. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (lamp base statuettes); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (photographs); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Acadia Co., 173 F. Supp. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (textile fabric designs).
179. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
180. Pe former'r Style, supra note 53, at 572.
181. Id. at 572-73.
182. House REPORT, supra note 119, at 52: "[A]n unfixed work of authorship, such as an
improvisation or an unrecorded choreographic work, performance, or broadcast, would con-
tinue to be subject to protection under State common law or statute, but would not be eligi-
ble for Federal statutory protection . .. ."
183. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 849, 603 P.2d 425, 448, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 346 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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position is untenable."'' 8 4
E. Contractual Protection
One opponent of performance style protection has stated that "the
ability to enter into detailed and enforceable contracts," along with the
right of privacy, gives performers "complete control" over the destiny
of their performances. 8 5 Unfortunately, such an absolute statement is
not wholly accurate. While a performer can, through contractual nego-
tiation, ensure certain protections for his or her creative efforts, this
protection is necessarily limited by virtue of the fact that it extends only
to the parties to such contracts or to those in privity with the con-
tracting parties.1
8 6
This section does not necessarily exhaust the list of possible theo-
ries under which performers may seek protection for their names, like-
nesses and identities.I' 7 Indeed, there may be a "veritable smorgasbord
of stretchable legal concepts lying around"'' 88 that litigants can rely on.
Rather, this section was intended to emphasize the appropriateness of
the right of publicity as a means for protecting performers adequately,
as well as the fact that, unlike other legal theories, it need not be
stretched far in order to fulfill that purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right of publicity should be fully recognized as a distinct com-
mon law property right, protecting the proprietary interest that a celeb-
rity has in his or her persona. As it continues to evolve toward that
end, the right of publicity should be construed more broadly so as to
encompass performance style, consisting of a unique combination of
posture, dress, mannerisms, gestures and vocal delivery that has been
sufficiently developed to distinguish a performer from others. Recogni-
tion of both performance style as the original creation of an individ-
ual's mind and the representation of the ideas that that individual
chooses to express, as well as the appositeness of the right of publicity
for protecting that creative effort, is a prerequisite to the provision of
184. Id.
185. Liebig, supra note 57, at 42 (emphasis in original).
186. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 214; The Rights of Performers, supra note 104, at 162.
187. See, e.g., Performer's Style, supra note 53, at 576-78, for a discussion of the possible
application of false advertising remedies under the provisions of section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). The plaintiff's cause of action based
thereon was rejected in the Booth case. 362 F. Supp. at 348-49.
188. Liebig, supra note 57, at 42.
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adequate redress for those performers injured by the wrongful appro-
priation of the pecuniary benefits of their fame.
Acceptable standards for determining the existence of a publicity
right violation can be established by reference to such traditional copy-
right concepts as the substantial similarity test and the fair use doctrine,
as well as to unfair competition principles regarding inequitable busi-
ness practices. But the analogies that can be drawn between the public-
ity doctrine and other more conventional theories in no way diminish
the indisputable fact that the protection provided by these theories has
proven inadequate.
Surely there remain unanswered questions concerning the applica-
tion of the right of publicity as advocated. Ultimately, of course, they
can be resolved by the specific facts of each case. But more impor-
tantly, the existence of unexplored issues should not detract from the
basic point that performers are deserving, and in need, of the safe-
guards that the publicity right is capable of affording. Once this be-
comes accepted, then perhaps Professor Nimmer's prediction in 1954,
that the right of publicity's full recognition would be assured by the
"fundamental fact of community needs," '189 may be finally realized.
Maria E. Levine
189. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 223.
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